Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of modality involves both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that modal notions are logically insignificant; the positive claim is that modals convey a ‘hint’ (Wink) as to the speaker’s grounds for judgement. This paper is about Frege’s positive claim, which has not received much attention. I explain in detail the Fregean notion of hinting and how to distinguish hints from conceptual contents, and I argue that Frege’s two-dimensional account of modal talk is (...) supported by various observations. However, it also seems clear that Frege’s account cannot be the whole story. (shrink)

What, exactly, is the difference between words such as ‘dead’ and ‘deceased’? In this paper, I argue that such differences in register, or style, ought to be construed as genuine differences in non-truth-conditional meaning. I also show that register cannot plausibly accounted for in terms of either presupposition or conventional implicature. Register is, rather, an instance of what I call pure use-conditional meaning. In the case of register, a difference in meaning does not correspond to a difference in the contents (...) speakers intend to convey. (shrink)

This paper offers a detailed reconstruction of Frege’s theory of side-thoughts and its relation to other parts of his pragmatics, most notably to the notion of colouring, to the notion of presupposition, and to his implicit notion of multi-propositionality. I also highlight some important differences between the subsemantic categories employed by Frege and those used in contemporary pragmatics.

This paper is partly exegetical, partly systematic. I argue that Frege's account of what he called “colouring” contains some important insights on how communication is related to mental states such as mental images or emotions. I also show that the Fregean perspective is supported by current research in psycholinguistics and that a full understanding of some linguistic phenomena that scholars have accounted for in terms of either semantics or pragmatics need involve psycholinguistic elements.

Uncovering an aspect of Gottlob Frege's linguistic theorizing that has until now received little attention, this volume offers the first detailed exposition of Frege's pragmatics. Thorsten Sander explores his views on colouring, side-thoughts, presuppositions, indexicals and illocutionary force and closely relates these to current research in philosophy of language and linguistics. Throughout his career, Frege was concerned with various secondary aspects of meaning. He claims, for instance, that the two words 'dog' and 'cur' differ not in what he (...) calls sense, but merely in colouring. By contrast, the difference between 'morning star' and 'evening star' is supposed to be a matter of sense. How exactly does sense differ from colouring? Frege also claims that by using a proper name one presupposes the existence of its bearer and that our utterances are frequently associated with side-thoughts. What exactly does he mean by these terms, and wherein lies the difference between these phenomena? Frege's Pragmatics answers questions such as these, providing a fresh perspective on Frege's account of various pragmatic aspects of language. In this first book-length treatment, Sandor makes the case that Frege's groundbreaking ideas are an essential part of his overall philosophical enterprise. (shrink)

Frege's mature writings apparently contain two different criteria of sense identity. While in "Über Sinn und Bedeutung" (1892) and in "Kurze Übersicht meiner logischen Lehren" (1906?) he seems to advocate a psychological criterion, his letter to Husserl of December 12, 1906 offers a thoroughly logical criterion of sense identity. It is argued that the latter proposal is not a "momentary aberration", but rather Frege's official criterion; his psychological criteria only serve as a way of illustrating questions of sense identity by (...) appealing to the thoughts of completely rational thinkers. (shrink)

I argue that “general pejoratives” such as “jerk” or “bastard” differ crucially from items such as “that damn N”. While items such as the latter typically serve to give vent to one's attitudes, general pejoratives essentially involve judgments about a person's behaviour or character. This is particularly evident in cases where pejoratives occur not as epithets, but as predicate nominals. If we want to account for the overall contribution of words such as “jerk”, there are three kinds of content that (...) ought to be distinguished: truth-conditional contents, evaluative presuppositions, and expressive contents that are either at-issue (in the case of expressive predicates) or non-at-issue (in the case of epithets). (shrink)

Frege’s Begriffsschrift account of modality involves both a negative and a positive claim. The negative claim is that modal notions are logically insignificant; the positive claim is that modals convey a ‘hint’ (Wink) as to the speaker’s grounds for judgement. This paper is about Frege’s positive claim, which has not received much attention. I explain in detail the Fregean notion of hinting and how to distinguish hints from conceptual contents, and I argue that Frege’s two-dimensional account of modal talk is (...) supported by various observations. However, it also seems clear that Frege’s account cannot be the whole story. (shrink)

Allocating the burden of proof and intuitions in philosophical disputes.– This paper criticises the view that in philosophical disputes the onus probandi rests on those who advance a position that contradicts our basic intuitions. Such a rule for allocating the burden of proof may be an adequate reconstruction of everyday justification, but is unreasonable in the area of philosophy. In philosophy it is not only difficult to determine the plausibility of a proposition, at the same time contradictory claims may be (...) equally plausible. – In contrast to such common sense proposals I try to show that in philosophical disputes the burden of proof does not depend on the material content of speech acts. A speaker simply bears the burden of proof for a proposition p if he has asserted that p and has agreed to justify it. (shrink)

Die Arbeit untersucht, in welcher Weise Regeln die Bedeutung von Sätzen bestimmen sowie eine handlungsanleitende Kraft entfalten können. Auf der Basis einer Analyse der Rede von regulativen und konstitutiven Regeln wird gezeigt, dass semantische Regeln als bedingte Erlaubnisse zu rekonstruieren sind, die es ermöglichen, die Bedeutung von Ausdrücken zirkelfrei zu bestimmen. Derartige Regeln stellen unverzichtbare Prämissen in praktischen Syllogismen dar, deren Konklusion den Vollzug eines Sprechaktes gebietet.

Das Werk Michel Foucaults hat das Feld politiktheoretisch informierter Analysen erheblich erweitert und dazu beigetragen, Grundbegriffe der Politischen Theorie neu zu verstehen. Der Band unternimmt erstmalig eine Bestandsaufnahme zum Spektrum der aktuellen Arbeiten mit und zu Foucault in der Politischen Theorie. Die Beiträge thematisieren Foucaults Konzeptionen von Freiheit, Kritik, Wahrheit, Macht oder Staat, verorten Foucault im Verhältnis zu Latour, Bourdieu oder Haraway und problematisieren Foucault u.a. vor dem Hintergrund der Geschichte des Marxismus und der Gegenwart des Neoliberalismus. Der Inhalt• Foucault, (...) die Politische Theorie und das Politische• Reflexion politiktheoretischer Grundbegriffe („Theorie“)• Komparatistische Studien („Vergleich“)• Neuperspektivierung konkreter Handlungsfelder („Problematisierung“) Die ZielgruppenStudierende, Lehrende und WissenschaftlerInnen in Politikwissenschaft, Soziologie, Kulturwissenschaft und Philosophie Die HerausgeberDr. Oliver Marchart ist Professor für Politische Theorie am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Wien.Dr. Renate Martinsen ist Professorin für Politische Theorie am Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Duisburg-Essen./div. (shrink)

This two-part paper reconstructs the analytic turn in American philosophy through a comparative longitudinal study of three major philosophy departments: Princeton, Yale, and Columbia. I trace their hiring policies, tenure decisions, curriculum designs, and the external pressures that forced them to continuously adapt their strategies; and I use those analyses to distill some of the factors that contributed to the rapid growth of analytic philosophy between 1940 and 1970. In this first part, I show that philosophers at Princeton, Yale, and (...) Columbia actively tried to promote a ‘humanistic’ conception of philosophy until the early 1950s. I argue that logical positivism and related ‘scientific’ approaches were seen as a fundamental threat to the discipline and that this opposition influenced decision making at all three institutions. While many students and recent graduates saw philosophy as a scientific discipline, senior members of the community deplored the decline of the humanities and appointed mostly humanistic philosophers. I show that this generational conflict was reinforced by demographic, political, and economic developments and argue that these discriminatory practices helped forge a coalition between logical empiricists, scientific pragmatists, and ordinary language philosophers, who all began to identify as ‘analytic’ philosophers after the war. (shrink)

This paper continues a reconstruction of the analytic turn in American philosophy between 1940 and 1970. The first part of this paper argued that philosophers at Princeton, Yale, and Columbia sought to stimulate ‘humanistic’ approaches to philosophy in their hiring policies and tenure decisions, thereby marginalizing the ‘scientific’ philosophies that were in vogue among their students. This second part unearths some of the mechanisms that contributed to the analytic turn once the movement’s fiercest opponents retired. I argue that a new (...) generation of deans and chairmen initially tried to craft ‘balanced’ departments but that various external variables— competition between elite universities, a shortage of graduates with training in modern logic, and the explosive growth of American higher education—eventually led to major policy shifts. Within a decade, I show, the distorted job market helped tip the balance into the other direction, strongly advantaging departments that had invested in analytic philosophy. By the late 1960s, the movement became so successful that the traditional division between humanistic and scientific approaches began to be replaced by a distinction between analytic and ‘continental’ philosophy, referring to the schools of philosophy that were popular across the Atlantic. American philosophy, by then, just was analytic philosophy. (shrink)

In this paper, we determine whether illegal hunting should be construed as a crime of dissent. Using the Nordic countries as a case study where protest-driven, illegal hunting of protected wolves is on the rise, we reconsider the crime using principles of civil disobedience. We invoke the conditions of intentionality, nonevasion, dialogic effort, non-violence and appeal to parameters of reasonable disagreement about justice and situate the Nordic illegal hunting phenomenon at a nexus between conscientious objection, assisted disobedience and everyday resistance. (...) This examination leads us to contend that the crime has heretofore received an inadequate response limited to punishment and deterrence. This contention finds support in the worsening predicaments of illegal hunting following harsh sanctions and stigmatization. Although hunters publicize injustices through their crimes, we find that killing wolves as a means to deliberative ends disqualifies hunters’ dissent as legitimate disobedience, creating an obligation of deliberative uptake on the part of society. Nonetheless, in a critical contribution to the field of criminal justice, we argue that it is instead the conditions of deliberative suboptimality experienced by hunters that create this obligation of uptake. Hence, in order to fulfill this obligation, we contend that the burden falls on regulatory agencies to better articulate the justifications for the policies that coerce hunters. We also advocate creating novel institutions to provide hunters with effective opportunities for contesting wildlife conservation directives. (shrink)

Lembecks Philosophiebegriff ist keine Zumutung Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-9 DOI 10.1007/s10743-011-9098-6 Authors Matthias Wille, Institut für Philosophie, Fakultät für Geisteswissenschaft, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Universitätsstraße 12, 45117 Essen, Germany Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848.

This book consists of the edited proceedings of a debate among Jurgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and Leszek Kolakowski that was held in Warsaw in May of 1995. It includes also commentary from those in attendance, including extensive remarks by Ernest Gellner. The debate marked the fortieth anniversary of the foundation of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and focussed primarily on topics related to historicism and cultural relativism.

English summary: The modern age understands justice not only as being an object of jurisprudence. Historical, philosophical, social and cultural studies along with theological approaches each draw near to justice in their own way. This collection devotes itself to the intricate interaction of outside perspectives with the judicial-interdisciplinary thematisation of the law, presenting revised papers delivered at the Protestant Institute for Interdisciplinary Research's symposium in honour of Professor Dr. Dres. h.c. Eberhard Schmidt-Aamann. The case studies and basic considerations deal with, (...) among other things, the function of the law in antique city states, the immanence and transcendence of justice from a theological perspective, as well as the relationship between economics and legal study. German description: Das Recht ist in der Moderne langst nicht nur Gegenstand der Rechtswissenschaft. Historische, philosophische, sozial- und kulturwissenschaftliche wie auch theologische Ansatze nahern sich dem Recht in je eigener Weise. Solche Aussenperspektiven stehen in komplexer Wechselwirkung mit der juristisch-binnendisziplinaren Thematisierung des Rechts. Dieser Sammelband ist dem Wechselspiel von Aussen- und Binnenperspektiven gewidmet. Er vereint die uberarbeiteten Beitrage eines Symposions, das an der Forschungsstatte der Evangelischen Studiengemeinschaft in Heidelberg zu Ehren von Prof. Dr. Dres. h.c. Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann veranstaltet wurde. Die exemplarischen Fallstudien und Grundsatzuberlegungen thematisieren unter anderem die Funktion des Rechts in antiken Stadtstaaten, die Immanenz und Transzendenz des Rechts aus theologischer Perspektive sowie das Verhaltnis von Okonomik und Rechtswissenschaft. Mit Beitragen von: Hans Diefenbacher, Hans-Joachim Gehrke, Klaus Gunther, Christoph Mollers, Thorsten Moos, Michael Moxter, Bernhard Nagel, Martin Ramstedt, Karl-Siegbert Rehberg, Magnus Schlette, Eberhard Schmidt-Assmann. (shrink)

This volume presents a study edition of the lectures delivered by Charles Peirce to the Lowell Institute in Boston in the Fall of 1903. These previously unpublished lectures present a comprehensive and revised statement of his work on the methods of science. Offering mature reflection on a lifetime's thought and work, they represent the culmination of Peirce's research on scientific objectivity. Alongside the Cambridge Conferences Lectures (1898, edited by K. L. Ketner), the Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism (1903, edited by P. (...) A. Turrisi), and the The Logic of Interdisciplinarity (the project of Peirce's Monist Series 1891-1909, edited by E. Bisanz), the Lowell Lectures of 1903 presented here offer significant insights into Peirce's mature phase as an explorer of objective methods in interdisciplinary science. This collection will appeal to anyone interested in the work of this great thinker, the history of science, and the history of American intellectual life. (shrink)

The integration of artificial intelligence throughout the economy makes the ethical risks it poses a mainstream concern beyond technology circles. Building on their growing role bringing greater transparency to climate risk, institutional investors can play a constructive role in advancing the responsible evolution of AI by demanding more rigorous analysis and disclosure of ethical risks.

This article focuses on the collective leadership of the civilian authorities of the British Channel Islands during the Nazi Occupation (1940-1945), and draws lessons from their ethical performance. The first part of the article determines that local officials in the Channel Islands disposed of operative margins, but that - in the interest of collaboration - these were not always used to the full. This article then details institutional factors that contributed to commonalities between the two bailiwicks of Jersey and Guernsey, (...) as they faced up to occupation. The second part of this article follows up with the dissimilarities, one of which is that Guernsey travelled further down the road to collaboration than her sister island. Social capital depletion is credited as being responsible for this; and this situation was further compounded by lack of 'ethical leadership'. The final part explores the relationship between social capital and leadership ethics, suggesting that virtue serves as a catalyst for social capital stock in crisis situations. The core research outcome is that ethical leadership produces tangible efficiency and moral effects in situations of extreme duress (such as Nazi Occupation) where one could have expected very little or no scope for such a thing. This is an uplifting message that runs counter to scepticism as to the practical value of business ethics. Implications are drawn with regard to the challenge of reconciling MNE activities with the moral complexity posed by globalization. (shrink)

Many scholars claim that Frege's theory of colouring is committed to a radical form of subjectivism or emotivism. Some other scholars claim that Frege's concept of colouring is a precursor to Grice's notion of conventional implicature. I argue that both of these claims are mistaken. Finally, I propose a taxonomy of Fregean colourings: for Frege, there are purely aesthetic colourings, communicative colourings or hints, non-communicative colourings.

The author argues that there is no such thing as a unique and general taxonomy of non-at-issue contents. Accordingly, we ought to shun large categories such as “conventional implicature”, “F-implicature”, “CI”, “Class B” or the like. As an alternative, we may, first, describe the “semantic profile” of linguistic devices as accurately as possible. Second, we may explicitly tailor our categories to particular theoretical purposes.

Quite a few scholars claim that many implicata are propositions about the speaker's epistemic or doxastic states. I argue, on the contrary, that implicata are generally non-epistemic. Some alleged cases of epistemic implicature are not implicatures in the first place because they do not meet Grice's non-triviality requirement, and epistemic implicata in general would infringe on the maxim of quantity. Epistemic implicatures ought to be construed as members of a larger family of implicature-like phenomena.

Why did Frege offer only proper names as examples of presupposition triggers? Some scholars claim that Frege simply did not care about the full range of presuppositional phenomena. This paper argues, in contrast, that he had good reasons for employing an extremely narrow notion of ‘Voraussetzung’. On Frege’s view, many devices that are now construed as presupposition triggers either express several thoughts at once or merely ‘illuminate’ a thought in a particular way. Fregean presuppositions, in contrast, are essentially tied to (...) names. (shrink)

Expressive-Assertivism, a metaethical theory championed by Daniel Boisvert, is sometimes considered to be a particularly promising form of hybrid expressivism. One of the main virtues of Expressive-Assertivism is that it seems to offer a simple solution to the Frege-Geach problem. I argue, in contrast, that Expressive-Assertivism faces much the same challenges as pure expressivism.

In der neueren Sprachphilosophie ist wiederholt der soziale Charakter des Redens betont worden. Das Buch versucht, diese These auf der Grundlage einer genauen Untersuchung der Abfolge einzelner sprachlicher Handlungen zu verteidigen. Die orthodoxe Sprechakttheorie hat sich bislang weitgehend auf die Gelingensbedingungen einzelner sprachlicher Vollzüge konzentriert. Isolierte Redehandlungen stellen allerdings in der kommunikativen Praxis einen Ausnahmefall dar: Ein kompetenter Sprecher muss nicht nur die vom sprachlichen Kontext unabhängigen Korrektheitsstandards kennen; vielmehr muss er auch in der Lage sein, die eigenen Sprechakte im (...) Rahmen eines Textes kohärent miteinander zu verknüpfen und auf Redehandlungen anderer so zu reagieren, dass ein genuiner Diskurs zwischen den Parteien entsteht – im Gegensatz zu einer bloßen Aneinanderreihung “für sich” korrekter Äußerungen. Das Buch verfolgt das Ziel, das für die Struktur derartiger Rede(handlungs)sequenzen einschlägige Reglement in seinen wesentlichen Aspekten zu rekonstruieren und insbesondere die für ein solches Projekt relevanten sprachphilosophischen Grundfragen zu klären. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The starting point for this article is Holton’s (2017) claim that there are no anti-factive attitude verbs (in Indo-European languages). In a first step, I argue that the German verb “wähnen” (as used by Frege and his contemporaries) is a counter-example. However, it seems as though anti-factives are rarer than factives, which raises the question of how to account for that observation. Since Holton’s explanation, as well as a seemingly promising neo-Gricean explanation, turns out to be unsuccessful, I turn (...) to the question of whether the rarity of anti-factives needs to be explained in the first place. I argue that, on closer inspection, anti-factives are not as special as they may appear, and I also argue that the comparative rarity of anti-factives can be explained via the principle of charity. (shrink)

Dem "Manifestationsargument" zufolge steht eine realistische Semantik der Wahrheitsbedingungen im Widerspruch zu dem Gedanken, dass das Verstehen von Sätzen eine Fähigkeit ist, die sich im Handeln manifestieren können muss. – Der Aufsatz zeigt, dass sowohl Realisten als auch Anti-Realisten die These aufzugeben haben, dass das Verstehen eines Satzes im Erfassen der jeweiligen Wahrheitsbedingungenbesteht. Die realistische Annahme der Existenz verifikationstranszendenter Wahrheiten steht – unabhängig vom Manifestationsprinzip – im Widerspruch zu einer wahrheitskonditionalen Semantik. Die von heutigen Anti-Realisten vertretenen Theorien des Verstehens sind (...) allerdings einem ähnlichen Einwand ausgesetzt, insofern sie gleichfalls nicht unsere Fähigkeit, unentscheidbare Sätze zu verstehen, erklären können. (shrink)

According to judgment internalism, there is a conceptual connection between moral judgment and motivation. This paper offers an argument against that kind of internalism that does not involve counterexamples of the amoralist sort. Instead, it is argued that these forms of judgment internalism fall prey to a Frege-Geach type argument.

According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ... – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ... –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of anti-realism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, not ..., (...) but .... Secondly, even if there were an intuitionistically acceptable proof of ..., i.e. an argument based on a different set of premises, the conclusion would have to be interpreted in accordance with Heyting semantics, and read in this way, the apparently preposterous conclusion would be true on conceptual grounds and acceptable even from a realist point of view. Fitch’s argument, understood as an immanent critique of verificationism, fails because in a debate dealing with the justification of deduction there can be no interpreted formal language on which realists and anti-realists could agree. Thus, the underlying problem is that a satisfactory solution to the “problem of shared content” is not available. I conclude with some remarks on the proposals by J. Salerno and N. Tennant to reconstruct certain arguments in the debate on anti-realism by establishing aporias. (shrink)

Die Idee, daß die Bedeutung sprachlicher Ausdrücke im Rückgriff auf ihren Gebrauch in der Sprache zu klären ist, ist seit Wittgenstein gängig. Das Buch verteidigt diesen Grundgedanken durch die Ausarbeitung einer prozeduralistischen Bedeutungstheorie, die zwei theoretische Strömungen zusammenführt: eine inferentialistische Semantik und eine konventionalistische Sprechakttheorie. Das Buch bietet darüber hinaus eine gründliche Diskussion realistischer und bescheidener Bedeutungstheorien sowie alternativer gebrauchstheoretischer Ansätze.

Es gehört zu den sprachphilosophischen Gemeinplätzen, daß ein elementarer Satz aus zwei Teilausdrücken besteht – einem Nominator, mit dem wir einen Gegenstand der Rede spezifizieren, und einem Prädikator, mit dem wir dem so herausgegriffenen Gegenstand eine Eigenschaft zuschreiben können. Während der semantische Referentialist Nominatoren typischerweise als solche Ausdrücke definiert, die eine explizite Bezugnahme auf genau einen Gegenstand ermöglichen, wird der Vertreter einer pragmatischen Bedeutungstheorie umgekehrt versuchen, die ontologische Kategorie des Gegenstandes im Rückgriff auf den Begriff des singulären Terminus einzuführen. Hierzu (...) ist es zur Vermeidung eines Zirkels nötig, Nominatoren in einer rein lingualen Weise zu charakterisieren. Der Aufsatz setzt sich mit R. Brandoms Vorschlag auseinander, dem zufolge singuläre Termini solche substituierbaren Ausdrücke sind, die nur in symmetrischen Ersetzungsrelationen stehen. Es wird – vor allem anhand von "indefinite descriptions" – gezeigt, daß eine derartige inferentielle Symmetrie weder eine notwendige noch eine hinreichende Bedingung darstellt. (shrink)

Die Arbeit ist ein Versuch, die Paradoxie der Wißbarkeit aufzulösen, indem gezeigt wird, daß zumindest Anti-Realisten, die zum logischen Revisionismus tendieren, die scheinbar absurde Konklusion ... akzeptieren sollten. Dazu wird zunächst in Abschnitt 1 gezeigt, daß die prima facie unproblematische These ... insofern sonderbar ist, als alle möglichen Instanzen normale oder performative Widersprüche darstellen. Auf dieser Grundlage wird in Abschnitt 3 ein retorsives Argument für das Prinzip ... entwickelt. Um den Einwand zu entkräften, daß im Zweifelsfall nicht die These ... (...) aufzugeben ist, sondern die Prinzipien zu verwerfen sind, auf denen das retorsive Argument basiert, wird in Abschnitt 4 auf die unterschiedlichen Optionen, die in der Argumentation auftretenden Formeln zu interpretieren, eingegangen: Wenn logische Operatoren gemäß der „BHK-Interpretation“ gedeutet werden, erweist sich selbst die These ... als auch für den Realisten akzeptable begriffliche Wahrheit. In Abschnitt 5 wird schließlich diskutiert, in welcher Weise ein Intuitionist Thesen formalisieren kann, die eine bestimmte Art von epistemischer Bescheidenheit artikulieren. (shrink)

Avicenna's logic has gathered much interest in recent decades. However, one significant point that has hitherto been frequently neglected is what logic means to Avicenna in the first place. Considering this issue, the main aim of this paper is to investigate Avicenna's account of logic. This is done by focusing on the logical sections of five of his comprehensive works, namely, the Kitāb al-Madkhal (of the Kitāb al-Shifāʾ, the Cure), al-Najāt (the Salvation), Dānishnāmi-yi ʿAlāʾ ī (Philosophy for ʿAlāʾ-ad-Dawla), al-Mashriqiyyūn (the (...) Easterners) and al-Ishārāt wa-t-tanbīhāt (the Pointers and Reminders). The reason for choosing these five works is fourfold, namely, logico-philosophical, linguistic, chronological and diversity of intended audience. Each work is analyzed based on the three fundamental elements which Avicenna links to the notion of logic, i.e. its definition, its status and its goal. The results of this analysis are then compared. Overall, Avicenna seems to have held a very stable account of logic across these works. (shrink)

Béatrice Acklin Zimmermann Barbara Schmitz An der GrenzeTheologische Erkundungen zum BösenUnter dem Eindruck der schrecklichen Ereignisse vom 11. September 2001, von Beslan, Abu Ghraib und Kana ist das Interesse "am Bösen"wiedererwacht. Dabei fällt auf, dass die in Politik und Gesellschaft erfolgten Deutungen des Bösen geprägt sind durch klare Grenzziehungen zwischen "gut"und "böse", die zunehmend auch auf religiöse Kategorien wie Licht-Finsternis, gerecht-sündig, Tod-Leben rekurrieren. Dies provoziert die Frage nach der Trennschärfe von "gut"und "böse": Wo genau verläuft die Grenze zwischen "gut"und "böse"und (...) wer zieht diese Grenze? Ist "das Böse"eine unabhängige Größe oder tritt es vielmehr in Vermischung mit "dem Guten"auf? Und was bedeutet die Grenzziehung zwischen "gut"und böse"im Blick auf Genderkonfigurationen?In ökumenischer Aufgeschlossenheit und aus verschiedenen theologischen Blickwinkeln erkunden die Autoren und Autorinnen dieses Bandes "das Böse"unter dem Gesichtspunkt von Grenzziehungen. Zur Debatte stehen dabei ebenso die Grenzziehung zwischen "gut"und "böse"und die damit verbundenen Dualisierungen wie die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von "Gender"und den Konstruktionen des "Bösen". In kritischer Abgrenzung zur gegenwärtigen gesellschaftlich-politischen Tendenz, das Böse primär beim Anderen, einer bestimmten Nation, Kultur, Gesellschaftsschicht oder Weltanschauung zu verorten, wird in den verschiedenen Beiträge gezeigt, dass eine strenge Grenzziehung zwischen dem "Bösen"und dem "Guten"der Komplexität der Wirklichkeit nicht standhält. Mit Beiträgen von Béatrice Acklin Zimmermann, Ruth Albrecht, Pierre Bühler, Barbara Henze, Ralph Kunz und Ute Nürnberg, Walter Lesch, Karl Matthias Schmidt und Barbara Schmitz. Die HerausgeberinnenBéatrice Acklin Zimmermannist Privatdozentin für Systematische Theologie an der Theologischen Fakultät der Universität Freiburg/Schweiz und Leiterin des Bereiches Theologie und Philosophie an der Paulus-Akademie Zürich. Barbara Schmitzist Studienrätin im Hochschuldienst für den Bereich Altes Testament und Sprachen an der Universität Duisburg-Essen. (shrink)

Abstract The debate on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been going on for decades, without leading to a clearer understanding of the term. Furthermore, the current literature on the topic remains relatively silent on the actual impact of CSR, especially the impact on issues of international development, for example poverty reduction in the Global South. By developing a conceptual assessment framework with a bipolar differentiated definition of CSR and a Sen-based notion of poverty, the article analyses the effects and impact (...) of two different types of CSR-strategies on the reduction of poverty. For this, two case studies have been conducted in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. The results imply that CSR measures which are built into the core business of a company (both transnational companies and small/medium sized companies) have larger effects on poverty than CSR measures which are located outside of the core business activities. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-33 DOI 10.1007/s13520-012-0016-6 Authors Maike J. Schölmerich, Institute for Development and Peace, University of Duisburg-Essen, Duisburg, Germany Journal Asian Journal of Business Ethics Online ISSN 2210-6731 Print ISSN 2210-6723. (shrink)

This paper argues that Hans Blumenberg’s theory illuminates a novel interpretation of the phenomenological concept of the lifeworld—as a world sustained by myths and their receptions. This paper combines two central themes in Blumenberg’s philosophy: his interpretation of Edmund Husserl and his aesthetics, especially his theory of the novel and of myth. My claim to originality is to offer a mythology of the lifeworld with the help of one of Blumenberg’s less-known texts, “Wirklichkeitsbegriff und Wirkungspotential des Mythos.” In the first (...) part, I will examine a crucial aspect in Blumenberg’s reading of Husserl’s notion of the lifeworld, namely the unorthodox view that the lifeworld, as the foundation for sciences and their logos, itself has no need to resort to language. To put it mythically: the lifeworld is an expressionless state of naivety. To support this deconstructive reading, I will then turn to Blumenberg’s theory of the novel. As has been noticed by Blumenberg and his colleagues, the underlying meaning structure of the novel, or its “concept of reality,” has a typically modern character, and largely overlaps with the phenomenological idea of the world and lifeworld. However, in the second part, I will radicalize Blumenberg’s discussions about reality, and show that the novelistic reality can never fully supersede that of myth. Mythology has a persistent existence, and, in Blumenberg’s argument, the history of mythical reception reveals a perpetual movement of human struggle against terror. In this Blumenbergian philosophy of mythology, a new image of the lifeworld presents itself, a world made by the myth-telling humans, by their active and aesthetic use of words, instead of slumbers of naivety. (shrink)

Antonio Gramsci - mit diesem Namen assoziieren wir zunächst ein philosophisches Modell, sprach- und kulturtheoretische Analysen, Gesellschaftskritik, emanzipatorische Politikvorstellungen. Weniger bekannt ist die pädagogische Grundlinie, die sich durch die gesamte theoretische und praktische Tätigkeit des italienischen Philosophen zieht. Die vorliegende Studie erschließt die pädagogische Vorstellungswelt und die Bildungsmodelle Gramscis sowohl im Sinne einer geschichtlichen Rekonstruktion, als auch im Hinblick auf ihre Gegenwarts- und Zukunftsrelevanz. Analysiert werden Gramscis pädagogische und bildungspolitische Überlegungen vor der Inhaftierung sowie die in den Gefängnisschriften und -heften (...) vorgenommenen erziehungs- und bildungstheoretischen Reflexionen. Zugleich wird die Frage aufgegriffen, wie Gramscis Bildungs- und Erziehungsvorstellungen heute weiterzudenken wären und welche Bereicherung in seinem Denken für eine emanzipative Erziehungswissenschaft liegt. - Armin Bernhard, Jg. 1957, ist Professor für Allgemeine Pädagogik am Fachbereich Bildungswissenschaften der Universität Duisburg-Essen, Standort Essen. Forschungsschwerpunkte: Allgemeine Pädagogik, Erziehungs- und Bildungstheorie, Geschichte der Pädagogik. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 42.3 (2006) 459-461 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Minutes of the Business Meeting Charles Sanders Peirce Society 28 December 2006Following the annual scholarly meeting, with papers by President Vincent Colapietro, "Reflective Acknowledgment and Practical Identity: Kant and Peirce on the Reflexive Stance" and Essay Contest winner Shannon Dea, "'Merely a Veil over the Living Thought': Math and Logic in Peirce's Forgotten Spinoza Review," (...) President Colapietro called the meeting to order shortly after 7 o'clock in Concourse B of the New York Hilton.The minutes of the 2003 and 2004 meetings, published in the Fall, 2004, and Summer 2005 Transactions respectively, were approved.Vincent Colapietro delivered the following report from the President and Executive Committee:André De Tienne's proposal to adopt the address of the Institute for American Thought at IUPUI as the official address of the Peirce Society was accepted.It was agreed that announcements for the Peirce Essay Contest should be placed in the Transactions and in other appropriate publications (e.g. The Journal of Speculative Philosophy and the S.A.A.P. newsletter) by mid-year if possible. It was also agreed that some length limits should be set for submitted essays and that there should be a requirement that essays meet the general standard of a submission for publication in a journal.There was discussion of the desirability of separating the collection of membership dues from subscription to the Transactions. The chief reasons for thinking that this separation might be called for are 1) the increasing availability of the Transactions through university library electronic subscriptions and 2) the higher cost of foreign subscriptions (making membership in the Society far most costly for foreign members). It was decided to revisit this issue in a year or two (after the new arrangement with IU Press has become more settled).Vincent Colapietro, Mark Migotti, and Nathan Houser were appointed to serve as a "meta" committee to form, with the approval of the Executive Committee, a "regular" committee to organize the 2014 Peirce World Congress. They will also recommend a chair for the committee and a location for the congress. Indianapolis was favored by members present.It was agreed that a list of rules and procedures for conducting Society business should be drawn up for the guidance of new Society office holders. These lists will include the rules and procedures for fulfilling the functions of the various offices, for running meetings, time-tables for making decisions, and so on. N. Houser will work on this with André Tienne and Mark Migotti to draft these lists. [End Page 459]It was agreed that the outgoing Chair of the Nominating Committee should communicate with the incoming Chair a list of the candidates who were considered but not nominated, along with the basis for consideration.Peter Hare delivered the following report on the Transactions:Starting with the fall issue, the Transactions is being published by Indiana University Press. Editorial arrangements are unchanged. Although the transition has been time-consuming in the short run, the new publishing arrangements promise in the long run to increase greatly the journal's impact on the world of scholarship. This year has also been difficult because a key staff member in our previous publishing arrangements failed us. In 2005 we had 499 member/subscribers (406 domestic and 93 foreign). The bank balance is $4008.Vincent Colapietro delivered for Mark Migotti a preliminary version of the following financial report :2005 income was $1,713.05 ($1,497 in membership dues and $216.05 in interest). 2005 expenditures were c. $1,987.40: ($500 for the essay contest prize, $550 for travel subvention and dinner for the contest winner; 674.40 for mailings; $128.40 for web-site fees; $75 dues to the Logic and Methodology section of the International Society for the Philosophy of Science, and $60.00 for a subsidized membership for CISPEC).As of December 31, 2005, the Society's assets were: $10,625.92, a decrease of $.274... (shrink)